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1. Introduction
 Disasters are a fundamental threat to human development 
because what takes several years or even decades to 
develop could be wiped away within a short moment 
thereby worsening pover ty because assets and 
livelihoods are destroyed in the process. The frequency 
of occurrence and intensity of disasters is increasing 
against the backdrop of increasing evidence of human-
induced climate change. As a result, reducing its often 
devastating impact on human civilization has become a 
top issue on the global agenda featuring in major policy 
processes and summits and scientific conferences. 
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is hence highlighted 
in several international documents, particularly UN-
related summits’ outcome documents and resolutions. 
For example, the importance of DRR is highlighted in 
paragraphs 187-189 of the Rio+20 Summit Outcome 
Document, ‘The Future We Want’ . DRR’s importance 
is further reiterated by UNESCO, the lead agency for the 
UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development 
(DESD, 2005-2014) as one of the top three thematic 
areas it is currently coordinating global efforts to address 
in addition to climate change and biodiversity as points of 
entry for promoting sustainable development practices 
through education and learning. 
 Launched in 2005 in Kobe in Hyogo Prefecture, 
Japan af ter approval by 168 countries at the 1st 
World Conference for Disaster Reduction, the Hyogo 
Framework for Action (HFA) has become the platform 
for global commitment to reduce disaster losses and 
encourage a more systematic and preventative approach 
to managing disaster risk. A UN-mandated 3rd World 
Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction will take place 
in Sendai City, Japan from 14 to 18 March 2015 and is 
expected to set the stage for a new global agreement 
on reducing the impact of both natural and man-made 
disasters. It will also review the 10-year implementation 
of the HFA and look for its successor to be referred to 
as Hyogo Framework of Action 2 (HFA2). Capacity is 
considered to be at the heart of reducing risk because 
a strong relationship exists between capacity and a 
country’s DRR. The need for DRR capacity development 
and assessment can be viewed from the perspective 
of the experiences of recent major disasters a greater 
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number of which has happened in Asia, particularly 
earthquakes, tsunamis and flooding. Given the enormous 
material and human catastrophe that Japan suffered 
during the Great East Japan Earthquake on 11 March 
2011, the choice of the conference venue could not be 
more appropriate.
 This paper discusses some aspects of capacity 
assessment especia l ly leadership, inst i tut ional 
arrangements, knowledge and accountability considered 
as relevant to DRR capacity development. References 
are made to the Japanese situation regarding the 
lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake 
(comprising an earthquake, a tsunami and a nuclear 
accident and will be referred to from hence as the Triple 
Disaster), particularly the Fukushima nuclear meltdown 
with the hope of developing a comprehensive, systematic 
DRR capacity assessment framework in the near future. 
Part 2 provides a brief description of DRR and capacity 
building/development. Part 3 presents a summary of a 
few capacity assessment approaches/frameworks and 
components and focuses on that of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). Part 4 discusses 
some aspects of the Triple Disaster particularly the 
lessons generated by the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 
the context of capacity assessment.
2. Disaster Risk Reduction and Capacity 
Building/Development
2.1. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR):
 Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is defined as “the concept 
and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic 
efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters 
including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened 
vulnerability of people and property, wise management of 
land and the environment, and improved preparedness for 
adverse events” (UNISDR, 2009: 4). Considered as the 
flagship document of DRR, HFA is seen as a response 
to the importance of implementing DRR measures in a 
comprehensive, integrated and multi-disciplinary manner. 
The framework presents a detailed strategy to integrate 
disaster risk reduction into national development policies 
and programmes over a decade. It also underscores the 
relationship between reducing disaster risk and achieving 
broader development goals and consequently mobilises 
stakeholders at local, national and international level to 
pay increasing attention to DRR as part of their wider 
development agendas (CADRI, 2010). 
 Furthermore, the HFA identifies five priority areas of 
action namely: 1) ensuring that disaster risk reduction 
is a national and local priority and is established within 
both national and local institutions, 2) disaster risk 
identification, assessment and monitoring are conducted 
in addition to enhancing early warning measures, 3) use 
of education, knowledge and renewed mindset to build a 
culture of safety and resilience at all levels, 4) reducing 
underlying risk factors, through incorporating activities 
into appropriate development sectors and programme 
areas, and 5) a strengthened disaster preparedness for 
effective response at all levels (CADRI, 2010). Further 
buttressing the importance of DRR at the global level, 
‘The Future We Want’ recommends the integration 
of early warning systems 1) “…into their national 
disaster risk reduction strategies and plans” , …. 2) “…
knowledge and information sharing…” and the need to 
3) “…undertake and strengthen in a timely manner risk 
assessment and disaster risk reduction instruments” , 
the importance of 4) “stronger inter-linkages among 
disaster risk reduction, recovery and long-term development 
planning, ….. more coordinated and comprehensive 
strategies that integrate disaster risk reduction and climate 
change adaptation…” and participation of a broad range of 
stakeholders (UNGA, 2012: 36).
2.2.  Capacity building/Capacity development
 Although often used interchangeably, basic conceptual 
differences exist between capacity building (CB) and 
capacity development (CD). For example, in terms of 
scope CD is generally viewed as being about change and 
transformation from within and is more comprehensive 
while CB is more linked with mechanical processes 
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and with technical cooperation suggesting that capacity 
is non-existent and has to be built from the scratch. 
Capacity development is defined by UNISDR (one of 
several definitions available) as “the process by which 
people, organisations and society systematically stimulate 
their capacities over time to achieve social, and economic 
goals, including through improvements of knowledge, 
skills, systems and institutions”(CADRI, 2010:9). All 
stakeholders are presented with a challenge by the HFA 
to focus on CD for DRR and in fact, the five priorities for 
action can only be achieved if CD issues and measures 
are integrated into the action agenda (CADRI, 2010). 
An effective CB/CD programme or strategy should 
have a well-developed stakeholder analysis and needs 
assessment methodology. Furthermore, to strengthen 
the existing capacity in a disaster risk management 
system, it is important to identify and understand the 
capacity gaps of past disasters. Formulation of a generic, 
systematic capacity assessment framework should 
incorporate those identified gaps and also policy, science, 
education, research and practice aspects of DRR coupled 
with set criteria that can be monitored and evaluated.
3. Capacity Assessment and DRR
 Several capacity assessment frameworks and approaches 
exist. They include the following:
• The 5-C approach was developed by the European 
Centre for Development Policy Management. It 
assesses individual and system-level capacities 
in the context of the organization and describes 
capacity as the meeting point of f ive central 
capabilities of organizations. They are the capability 
to a) commitment and engagement, b) carrying 
out tasks, c) relating and attracting resources and 
support, d) adapting and self-renew, and e) balance 
diversity and coherence (Baser and Morgan in Babu 
and Kolavalli, 2013). 
• Managing for Development Results CAP-Scan 
Diagnostic Review scores governments’ attempts to 
develop public sector capacity through conduction 
of assessments that identifies the strengths and 
capacity gaps. This is done in four capacity building 
stages namely awareness, experimentation, 
transition, and sustainable implementation. This 
is done in the context of five pillars: leadership, 
accountability and partnerships, monitoring and 
evaluation, planning and budgeting and statistics 
(MfDR 2009).
• The United Nations Development Programme’s 
(UNDP) has formulated a capacity assessment 
framework that is premised on its refined capacity 
development approach and is structured around 
five steps namely 1) engagement of stakeholders 
on capacity development, 2) assessment of capacity 
assets and needs, 3) formulation of capacity 
development response, 4) implementation of 
the response, and 5) evaluation of the capacity 
development (UNDP, 2010). UNDP uses three 
dimensions from which it assesses capacity needs/
gaps. They are: 1) points of entry referring to 
the level (individual, organization, or enabling 
environment)1  from which assessment can be 
started; 2) the core issues which define the scope 
of the assessment and may include: leadership, 
policy and legal framework, mutual accountability 
mechanisms, public engagement, and resources 
(human, financial, physical, and environmental); 
and 3a) five functional capacities: engage in multi-
stakeholder engagement/dialogue, situation analysis 
and vision creation, policy and strategy formulation, 
o 1 The individual dimension relates to a variety of abilities, with an emphasis on aspects including inter-disciplinarity and process skills with influences from 
such as attitude, perception, cultural orientation and intuitive faculty as subjective determinants 
o Institutional capacity requirements emphasises collective learning and institutional change, i.e., understanding and dealing with multiple perceptions or 
world-views in addition to skills.
o The systemic dimension closely associated with the ‘enabling environment’ , that is, appropriate policy and legal frameworks, a clear definition of 
institutional roles and mandates, widespread access to information, vertical linkages, etc.
宮城教育大学 環境教育研究紀要　第 16 巻 (2014)
－ 55 －
budget, management and implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation, and 3b) technical capacities (UNDP 2008). 
Some of the core issues will provide the main context 
for the discussion in this paper namely 1) institutional 
arrangements, 2) leadership, 3) knowledge, and 4) 
accountability.
 Institutional arrangements is a core issue relevant 
across most aspects of governance, public sector 
management and development activities. It addresses 
the policies, procedures, systems and processes that 
countries have in place to functionalise their political 
mandates, development policies and objectives as a 
way to promote good governance. Because optimal 
procedural structures in terms of efficiency and impact 
are often unacknowledged, inefficiencies in institutional 
arrangements are only identified during capacity 
assessments. The reason is because new procedures and 
programmes are often developed without incorporation 
into previously existing ones and this is commonly found 
in intra-ministerial and multi-agency work (UNDP, 2008; 
UNDP, 2010). 
 Leadership expresses itself at multiple ways and levels 
(individual or organisation) and has the elements of 
vision, competence and integrity at its core.  Effective 
leadership can transcend individual-to-individual capacity 
level to organisational capacity level and thus help 
to advance a strategic planning and an agenda that is 
vision-driven. Leadership capacities can be enhanced 
through strategies like strengthening the abilities of 
the organisation regarding vision setting, transparency, 
a sense of readiness, systems thinking, assessment of 
potential risks and managing them through establishing 
collective management systems that encourage learning 
(UNDP, 2008 and UNDP, 2010).
 Knowledge is considered as the foundation of capacity 
and it includes measures for creating and enhancing 
knowledge using different teaching approaches and 
in all educational settings. Developing knowledge 
through improvement in expertise and organisational 
learning strategies occurs at organisational level. 
Professional training, experience sharing and knowledge 
management systems in the organisations are some of 
the approaches to strengthen knowledge capacity at this 
level. Knowledge capacity at a societal level is often best 
addressed through reforming formal education systems 
to ensure that younger generations will have the skills 
and know-how to deal with current and emerging risks. 
Stimulation of actionable knowledge can also be effected 
through organisational networks, communities of practice 
and multi-agency information and learning platforms that 
assembles together entities of the non-formal education 
sector including civil society organizations, government 
and donor agencies (CADRI, 2010; UNDP, 2008 and 
UNDP, 2010).
 Accountability as an important lever of change lies in 
its provision of oversight, monitoring and evaluation to 
guarantee that processes and programmes are leading 
to the expected objectives, and providing mechanisms 
to overcome obstacles and identify shortcomings when 
necessary. Additionally, through the establishment of 
systems for public accountability and transparency, 
governments’ responsibilities to reach the needs of 
their citizens are also ensured and can provide an 
added benefit of encouraging mutual engagement 
in development activities. Other aspects that can 
improve accountability capacities include strengthening 
the feedback mechanisms such as open access to 
information, encouraging people to voice their opinion, 
ensuring robust monitoring and evaluation systems, 
and integrating knowledge and experiences into future 
programmes (UNDP, 2008; UNDP, 2010).
 The UNDP capacity assessment approach is being 
embraced and used in several sectors and f ields 
including the DRR community due to aspects including 
the following: 1) its flexibility allows one to adapt it to 
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several CD situations, 2) it is able to link the three points 
of entry and hence promote a holistic approach across 
the three, 3) it emphasises systematisation for example 
of a nation’s assets, plans and strategies and expertise as 
well as measures capacity development systematically, 4) 
it discourages the use of rigid blueprints and emphasises 
adaptation to local conditions (UNDP, 2008). Additionally, 
paragraphs 21-23 of the UNISDR’s ‘Towards a Post-2015 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction’ describe the 
importance of institutional arrangements, legislation and 
policy, coordinated and coherent action, accountability 
measures both in scale and range to guide government 
and public awareness of and access to information on 
disaster risks and support for DRR (UNISDR, 2012).
4. The Japan Experience and DRR Capacity 
Assessment
 This section discusses aspects of the Triple Disaster 
(particularly the Fukushima nuclear disaster), the 
capacity gaps identified and lessons generated in the 
context of DRR capacity assessment.
 Japan is well advanced in disaster preparedness and risk 
reduction and yet was rattled on March 11, 2011 by its 
largest earthquake on record and the fourth largest ever 
recorded in the world. This giant temblor generated a 10-
15 story tsunami that triggered a nuclear accident and 
has been rated as equal in severity to the 1986 accident 
at Chernobyl, the worst nuclear disaster on record 
according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
This complex catastrophe comprising an earthquake, 
tsunami and nuclear meltdown killed nearly 20,000 
people. Hundreds of thousands (about 500,000) of people 
were displaced and a large area of beautiful countryside 
was contaminated and some areas will remain so for 
several decades. Nearly three years later, the affected 
communities are struggling to recover and more than 
140,000 people are still living in shelters. Significant 
distrust of industry, government and even of researchers 
remains due to the emergence of several challenges 
during and after the accident (FGCP, 2014; IGEL, 2013).
 Japan has had more than its share of natural disasters 
in comparison to its land size. These include multiple 
active volcanoes, being prone to flooding annually and 
experiencing several typhoons every summer. It is also 
a country that sits on multiple active faults. Japan can 
therefore hardly survive without having a relatively 
comprehensive disaster mitigation and response 
planning and infrastructure in place. Consequent to this 
careful planning, it is viewed as a model for disaster 
preparedness (Des Marais et al., 2012).
 The Central Disaster Management Council (CDMC) is at 
the helm of Japan’s disaster management infrastructure 
and is the major policy engine for the management of 
disaster in Japan. It comprises the Prime Minister and 
the entire Cabinet, local leaders, and experts in the 
field (Government of Japan, 2005). Established by the 
Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act of 1961 to “ensure 
the comprehensiveness of disaster risk management 
and to discuss matters of importance with regard to 
disaster management”, it is responsible for design and 
implementation of national risk management strategies 
with regard to issues related to safety, mitigation, and 
risk reduction (Government of Japan, 2005: 1). The 
government formulates strategies and engages in 
different kinds of knowledge construction, information 
dissemination, and capacity building investments through 
the CDMC. Early warning and monitoring systems 
covering the nation are in place following a countrywide 
risk assessment involving public, private, research and 
academic partners. Furthermore, information materials 
geared towards educating and training a variety of fields 
and sectors as well as education settings have been 
developed and are buttressed by a complex of national-
local and public-private partnerships (Des Marais et al., 
2012).
 Using the lessons learned from the previous big crisis 
namely the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, Japan had 
diligently been preparing for future disasters. However 
problems emerged partly due to the enormity and 
complexity of the Triple Disaster which stretched the 
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effectiveness of the Japanese disaster risk management 
system to its limit and partly due to human shortcomings. 
The report commissioned by the National Diet of Japan 
sums it all up: “The government, the regulators, TEPCO 
management, and the Kantei lacked the preparation and 
the mindset to efficiently operate an emergency response to 
an accident of this scope. None, therefore, were effective in 
preventing or limiting the consequential damage.” (IGEL, 
2013:3).
Leadership and knowledge capacities gaps
 Al though the sca le o f the Tr ip le Disaster was 
unprecedented in living memory, however, according 
to several post-Fukushima reports the disaster should 
have been anticipated (IGEL, 2013). The judgments 
made and the actions taken by government and leaders 
of industry were later found to be inadequate and in 
some instances compounded the problems.  For example, 
the tsunami and the destruction of the Daiichi nuclear 
reactors was entirely predictable because it had been 
recorded in the literature that earthquakes of similar 
magnitude have struck that part of Japan, once every 
100 years on average – a pattern well known since 
ancient times – and each one generated a catastrophic 
tsunami of similar magnitude. The previous tsunami in 
1933 was in fact, nearly as high as the one that struck in 
2011. Furthermore, a monument dating back to the first 
century still sits on a hill, high above the area devastated 
by the 2011 tsunami, with the inscription: “Beware 
the great tsunami; do not build below this level” (IGEL, 
2013 :  3). Three areas of capacity critical to leadership in 
a crisis that emerged from the Triple Disaster and need 
attention are emergency preparations, leadership style 
and communications (IGEL, 2013).
Institutional arrangements capacity gaps
 At the peak of the nuclear crisis, designation of roles 
and responsibilities was inadequate and there were 
coordination and information flow challenges between 
the office of then Prime Minister (the Kantei) and 
Tokyo Electric Power Company Limited (TEPCO), the 
nuclear plant operator. There was also mismatch of 
administrative boundaries and activities at that level to 
the point that once the Prime Minister had to visit the 
plant to ascertain things himself. Also, soon after the 
disaster there was a shortage of essential items such 
as food, water and particularly gasoline in the affected 
region and this was partly attributed to the fear of truck 
drivers to drive to the Tohoku region because of alleged 
high level of radioactive contamination. Nuclear experts 
directly linked to the CDMC failed to participate and be 
visible during the government’s public relations efforts 
to provide scientific information at least in approximate 
terms rather than leaving it to the politicians and the 
plant operator. This contributed to the distrust of the 
information that was being put out by the government 
and TEPCO. From partial briefings, provision of vague 
answers or refusing to answer questions during press 
conferences, to delayed information, etc., TEPCO’s 
performance has been seen as troubling virtually across 
the board with the exception of the brave workers 
who sacrificed their future lives to somewhat save the 
situation (Kaufmann and Penciakova, 2011).
 There have been times when the relations between the 
local governments in the affected region and the central 
government have not been very cordial with regard to 
implementation of some post disaster policies due to 
different perspectives of understanding of the available 
information. Stronger linkages between national and local 
government/people based on transparency in relation 
to the crisis is crucial for the rebuilding of trust. Those 
in the position of responsibility need to give attention 
to transferring risk information and the interpretation 
of the understanding of such risks to the recipients. 
More community participation in the decision-making 
process and provision of relevant knowledge regarding 
the operations of such infrastructure with significant 
underlying risks that are close to communities should be 
ensured.
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Accountability capacity gaps
 Significant political and economic power is alleged to 
back the nuclear industry in Japan. The management of 
TEPCO was said to have built the reactors on a known 
fault line and then colluded with government regulators 
to avoid preparing for the inevitable (IGEL, 2013). 
Furthermore, the government and the nuclear power 
industry had been warned by the US Atomic Energy 
Commission that reactors like those in Fukushima 
Daiichi had not been built to withstand major earthquakes 
just like other nuclear reactors in Onagawa, Shika, 
Kushiwazaki, etc. (Kaufmann and Penciakova, 2011). 
There were also aspects of corporate practices that are 
not only unique to the Japanese corporate community: 
situations where private companies’ liabilities are capped 
by the value of their net assets, the amount beyond 
which the companies pay nothing. TEPCO, like any 
other private company was then left with “no incentive 
to limit damages beyond the value of those net assets”. This 
resulted in TEPCO wildly underplaying the risk of a 
gigantic earthquake and tsunami, “but it did not underplay 
it carelessly or negligently. It underplayed it rationally - 
wildly, but rationally” (IGEL, 2013:3). 
 TEPCO’s overall performance in handling the nuclear 
crisis has been subpar. There have been recorded failures 
in the past regarding practice standards and several 
more after the disaster.  Aspects like poor plant safety, 
poor communication, lacking “basic understanding 
of measuring and handling radiation” , incorrect data 
reporting, etc. (several of which have been reported in 
the media) have been problematic to this day. Blame 
sharing can go around. The regulatory agency, Nuclear 
and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), a department 
under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI) was lax in its inspection (Saito, 2014; Kaufmann 
and Penciakova, 2011) although this has been recently 
rectified by replacing it with a more independent National 
Regulatory Authority (NRA). Even the global nuclear 
watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) was slow in getting involved in the crisis. There 
have also been reports of contracted workers of some 
private companies sub-contracted by TEPCO to clean 
the contamination not being paid well. Granted that the 
Fukushima disaster is going to take a long time to fix, 
poor treatment of workers might lead to future shortage 
of such workers and hence hamper the decontamination 
and reconstruct ion programmes. Appoint ing an 
independent body or an ombudsman to protect the rights 
of such contracted workers will be in order. Other gaps 
to address include: 1) strengthening the independence of 
the NRA and giving it some level of power to effectively 
play its oversight role in the nuclear industry, 2) 
evaluating the “moral hazard” that arises when potential 
losses of a catastrophe far exceed the value of a company, 
3) need for “system chain/process chain” liability, i.e., 
to hold accountable all actors involved with the nuclear 
power industry: manufacturers, regulators, operators, 
government, etc. for negligence when that is determined 
in a disaster. Currently several joint lawsuits have been 
filed against 1) three companies that manufactured 
reactors at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant 
for making a faulty product (Yamaguchi, 2014), and 
2) TEPCO separately or jointly with the Japanese 
Government for failure to provide accurate information 
on the radioactive emissions or for negligence of 
responsibility, with more set to follow. IAEA should be 
more proactive and intervene in a timely manner during 
a future nuclear crisis.
Socio-cultural capacity gaps
 Riding on the myth of “absolute safeness” of nuclear 
power as the then Prime Minister himself later admitted 
in an interview, government and business had managed 
to place this into the cultural psyche of the people and 
therefore were not prepared nor did they leave room for 
the worst-case scenario (IGEL, 2013; Corkill, 2013). Also, 
the prolonged period and high intensity of the seismic 
activity (aftershocks) were equally devastating mentally. 
Although many NGOs and individuals went to offer their 
support to the disaster victims (Shimano and Hirose, 
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2012), there was a shortfall of mental health care staff 
(psycho-social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists, etc). 
It should also be acknowledged that due to attachment of 
social stigma to mental problems in Japan, some affected 
people would not go for consultation/treatment (Brumfiel, 
2013).
 After much preparation for decades based on prior 
disaster experiences, the Triple Disaster overwhelmed 
all that had been put in place partly because some 
installations and structures had been prepared below 
the threshold of the complex disaster that struck. For 
example, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex, was 
prepared for only a magnitude 8 earthquake and levees 
and flood barriers were not designed to withstand the 
category of tsunami that reached 40 meters tall and 
travelled inland nearly ten kilometres (Des Marais et al., 
2012). Issues that need to be addressed regarding the 
previous discussion include 1) strengthening knowledge 
capacity for understanding the underlying dangers of 
relevant risk-prone infrastructure and also the cascading 
effects of one disaster turning into multiple disasters e.g., 
earthquake > tsunami > fire outbreak from installations/
nuclear disaster, and 2) addressing the currently existing 
mental health care challenges in the affected areas and 
strengthening capacity for future post-disaster mental 
health care. 
 But it was not all gloom: 1) the ability of most buildings 
including houses to withstand this very strong 
earthquake, 2) constant updates on the crisis accessible 
on mobile phones and the prevention of derailment 
of high-speed trains due to improvement in the early 
warning systems after the Great Hanshin Earthquake, 
and 3) the stoic nature of the people and their resilience 
that became an envy of the world were some of the bright 
spots. Furthermore, having shown generosity to many 
countries affected by disaster, Japan further showed the 
way to international collaboration (a key component 
in DRR) when the “politics of national sovereignty” 
was kept to a minimum but instead, the government 
reached out to several countries  for help such as medical 
assistance, food aid, and psychosocial support (Des 
Marais et al., 2012).
5. Conclusion
 Added to several other natural disasters that affect 
Japan, it is the only country to suffer both intended and 
unintended consequences of nuclear power: the dropping 
of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster, respectively. Economically, it 
has experienced the top two most expensive disasters in 
the history of humanity with the estimated cost running 
into several hundreds of billions of US dollars – the Great 
East Japan Earthquake is purported to cost between 235-
300 billions US dollars and the Great Hanshin Earthquake 
of Kobe was estimated to have cost 91 billion US dollars. 
Although risk management (including DRR management) 
has been part of the Japanese planning and development 
processes, yet sometimes there is the issue of what to 
plan for against the backdrop of limited resources and 
uncertainty of what threshold to adequately prepare 
for. Also, risk probability and mitigation cost must be 
balanced against other societal needs. The need therefore 
to put in place protocols to increase human resilience to 
be able adapt to such extreme although rare events is 
critical. 
 A recovery from the current disaster and future ones 
will depend largely on addressing the discussed gaps 
from the Triple Disaster and from past experience in 
the context of a couple of things. With reference to the 
“hardware” capacity strengthening, opportunities exist 
for implementing some disaster resistant measures 
particularly during the ongoing reconstruction of 
infrastructure. Additionally, formulating a generic 
but systemic DRR capacity assessment framework 
comprising both “hardware” and “software” capacity 
that incorporates the HFA priority areas using ‘enabled 
environment’ as the entry point and addressing all 
relevant DRR capacities including solutions to those 
capacity gaps discussed in this paper will be appropriate. 
Such a framework should ensure horizontal and vertical 
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linkages of the constituent DRR capacities from national 
to local levels. Other frameworks developed for more 
specific sectors or fields (e.g. the Education for Natural 
Disaster Preparedness and Reduction framework for 
the lower and middle formal education sector (Goto and 
Okamoto, 2012) should be linked to this framework at 
the appropriate leverage point(s).
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